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Introduction 
 
During the nineties, monetary authorities in many countries achieved a 
goal that was very elusive during the seventies and the eighties: to keep 
inflation in a low and stable level. However, this price stability has not came 
hand-in-hand with higher asset price stability. Countries such as Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Japan and the United States are facing cycles in asset prices 
even more pronounced than those they faced during the decades of high 
inflation (Borio et al, 2003). Asset prices, credit and investment booms, and 
bust, have become a more important source of macroeconomic instability in 
both developed and developing countries. 
 
A high volatility in asset prices is worrisome because, when financial 
unbalances unwind, the real economy is exposed to a substantial economic 
downturn and, very frequently, to recession and possible deflation. Therefore, 
asset price cycles still remains an important challenge for monetary authorities.  
 
Policy-makers should also be aware of the fact that bubbles in house 
prices are more worrisome that those in equity prices, in part, because these 
tend to reflect domestic credit conditions, whereas equity prices tend to reflect 
global forces (Selody and Wilkins, 2004). Most industrial countries experienced 
sometimes violent boom and bust cycles in credit markets in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Hofmann, 2001). Similarly, Latin American countries experienced a 
boom and bust cycle in both, property prices and credit aggregates. There is 
clear evidence that in Latin American countries during the 1990s, asset prices 
booms contributed to an increased perception among individuals about 
positives changes in wealth and their creditworthiness that allowed agents to 
increase their indebtedness (Herrera and Perry, 2003).   
Likewise, housing prices are more likely to end in a bust and to be costly.  
For example, Helbling and Terrones (2003) find that only 25 per cent of the 
equity-price booms in the past 30 years ended in busts, while around 50 per   3
cent of house price booms ended in bust. Housing price bubbles give home 
buyers a false sense of the real return they can expect on their investment, 
which can lead to speculative home buying and overinvestment in the real 
housing stock. This can lead to overinvestment in physical capital, 
overconsumption, and overextension of credit. The process reverses when the 
bubble burst. The decline in housing prices results in a deterioration in balance 
sheets that constrains spending and investment. Given a lower value of 
collateral, the financial institutions are less willing to lend. This can cause 
decreased spending on investment, consumption and increased bankruptcies.  
 
The main goal of this paper is to provide some elements to the debate 
about a direct response of monetary policy to asset prices based in the recent 
Colombian experience with the housing sector. The analysis is based on an 
extension of a structural dynamic general equilibrium model of financial 
accelerator for the housing sector developed for Aoki, et al (2004). The extension 
of the model consists in allowing the possibility of non-fundamental 
movements in housing prices (bubbles). The model is calibrated for the 
Colombian economy and then some simulation exercises are performed to 
establish the response of the main macroeconomic variables when monetary 
policy react to housing prices misalignments and when it does not.  
 
The first section of the paper presents a brief overview of the debate on 
monetary policy and asset prices. A description of some stylized facts of the 
Colombian economy is presented in section two. Section three presents the 
model used for simulations and some econometric evidence for Colombia. The 
results of the model-based simulations under alternative scenarios are 
presented in Section four. Section five concludes. 
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1. A brief overview of the debate on the reaction of monetary policy to  
    asset prices. 
 
The developments addressed before and their consequence for 
macroeconomic stability have led economist and policymakers to wonder 
whether central banks should take greater account of asset price movements in 
making interest rate policy, (Goodfriend, 2003). 
 
Some work has been done in order to identify asset prices misalignments 
and certain consensus about some indicators that can be used to identify when 
a bubble is building up. However, economists have yet to reach a consensus 
about the use of monetary policy as the appropriate policy for fighting asset 
prices misalignments. Some economists think that the Central Banks should 
have a monetary framework that allow for a pre-emptive tightening of policy to 
limit the building up of bubbles in financial markets, (Cecchetti, 2000, Borio 
2004, Filardo, 2001, among others). This strategy requires, however, that asset 
prices bubbles and their effect on the economy be identified with some 
precision. Other economist sustain that the fickle nature of bubbles suggest that 
there is much potential for an activist policy-maker to get the timing wrong, 
thereby making matters worse (Bernanke, 1999, Stokton, 2003, Goodfriend, 
2003, Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, among others). This is so because speculative 
pressures could be too strong and expected returns too high. Therefore, 
attempts to restrain them could derail other, more expenditure-sensitive 
sectors, possibly causing the very recession that policy was designed to avert.  
 
This lack of consensus among economist and policymakers is reflected in 
the reluctance of central banks to use their policy rate as an instrument lo lean 
against the growing bubbles. Some other factors reinforce this reluctance. First, 
given the likely effects of tightening on output and earnings, the central bank 
may not be able to demonstrate convincingly that the action was necessary 
(Borio, et al., 2003). Moreover, the decision to tighten when output growth is   5
robust but inflation appears to remain in check would be difficult to justify to 
the public. Second, in practice, current techniques for identification of asset 
prices misalignments are not precise enough. Third, asset prices can mislead 
interest rate policy in practice. For example, as described by Goodfriend (2003), 
under a scenario of rising trend productivity, firms and households are induced 
to borrow against their improved future income prospects in order to spend 
some of the expected increase in future income currently. Initially, aggregate 
demand may increase at a higher pace than current potential output but 
inflation pressures may take time to build up. Eventually, trend productivity 
growth will stop rising and firms profits will grow slowly. However, by that 
time inflation may start rising. Labor markets will be tighter and firms will find 
it harder to finance wage growth out of productivity. At that moment, the 
central bank may have to raise short term interest rates to keep inflation under 
control, even if equity prices fall.  
 
Therefore, given the uncertainties involved, policy-makers generally 
show a preference to respond to the financial imbalances fairly gradually as 
illustrated by the experience in Japan and the United States, and to use 
prudential regulation as an additional instrument that could help to contain the 
financial excesses. During the upswing of the boom supervisors could induce 
the lenders to limit their exposures.  
 
2. Financial markets and cyclical fluctuations in the Colombian economy 
 
The most important stylized facts about the relationship between 
financial variables and economic fluctuations in Colombia are also common to 
different economies:  
 
The first factor has to do with growing financial liberalization around the 
world. Countries of the G-7 began a move towards financial liberalization in the 
mid-1970s, (Borio, 2003). Developing countries, among them Colombia, started 
their financial liberalization during the late 1980s. The greater financial market   6
integration fostered an acceleration of cross-border financial flows. The 
Colombian business cycle was mainly determined by changes in the prices of 
coffee and, in general, by the terms of trade during the 1980s (Charts 2.1 and 
2.3). In contrast, financial capital inflows were highly correlated with the 
business cycle during the 1990s and 2000s, (Chart 2.2).  
 
The second stylized fact has to do with credit markets. Since the 1970s 
many countries have experienced two mayor output cycles that typically 
coexisted with similar fluctuations in credit. This correlation is also observed in 
the Colombian business cycle (Charts 2.4). Chart 2.5 shows that over the period 
1980-2005 private sector credit was characterized by pronounced cycles. Most 
industrial countries experienced violent boom and bust cycles in credit markets 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Colombia experienced a boom and bust cycle 
in the mid 1980s and another boom in the mid 1990s. The severity of the bust in 
the late 1990s was stronger that in the late 1980s.  Likewise, the boom and bust 
cycle of mortgage credit was more severe in the 1990s than in the eighties, 
(Chart 2.5).  
 
  The third fact is related to the wealth effects of changes in property prices 
over household indebtness and over the business cycle. Several studies show 
that there is a close correlation between developments in credit markets and 
property prices. In Chart 2.6 we show this correlation for the Colombian data. 
The positive correlation between credit and property prices can be explained 
from both a credit demand and a credit supply perspective. Real asset prices 
depend on the discounted future stream of real dividend payments. Higher 
liquidity may have an indirect effect on asset valuations by lowering interest 
rates and the discount factor or by indicating brighter economic conditions and 
prospects and thus higher expected dividend payments. But it may also be that 
additionally available liquidity simply increases the demand for a fixed supply 
of property, driving up real property prices (Hofmann, 2001). 
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Finally, changes in asset prices “accelerate” the business cycle through a 
wealth effect.  The correlations between housing prices and some aggregate 
variables in Colombia are presented in table 2.1.  Even though these correlations 
are lower that correlations observed in industrialized countries, their 
magnitude are not small.  As expected, the higher correlations are between 
housing prices, housing investment and durable consumption.   
 
Table 2.1.  Correlations of house prices with aggregate variables
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Output 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.37 0.29
Housing Investment 0.28 0.39 0.53 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.41
Total Consumption 0.54 0.58 0.45 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.10
Durable consumption 0.30 0.42 0.51 0.60 0.49 0.38 0.35
N o n - d u r a b l e  c o n s u m p t i o n 0 . 5 60 . 5 80 . 4 30 . 2 80 . 1 80 . 0 90 . 0 3




The importance of changes in housing prices in the Colombian economy 
has to do with the fact that more than half of household assets are invested in 
housing. Table 2.2 reports the composition of household assets in the G7 
countries and Colombia.  The figures reveal that housing assets represent a 
higher share of total household assets in Colombia than in developed countries. 
In contrast, the equity market is very small. Thus changes in property prices 
have a more considerable impact on private sector wealth than changes in stock 
prices.   
 
Housing assets Equity Other Financial  Other tangible
 Assets assets
United States 21 20 50 8
Japan 10 3 44 43
Germany 32 3 35 30
France 40 3 47 9
Italy 31 17 39 13
United Kingdom 34 12 47 7
Canada 21 17 39 23
Colombia 64 1 35 n.a
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2000, Table VI.1 and Banco de la República for colombian data
Table 2.2
Composition of Household assets (in percentages)
   8
 
In the next section we model the transmission mechanism between 
changes in housing prices and the business cycles for an economy like 
Colombia, and we analyze the effects of different responses of monetary policy 



































































Total private capital flows
Foreign direct investment, net
Source: Banco de la Republica
Chart 2.6
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Mortgage Credit/GDP   (RHS)
Source: Banco de la Republica and ICAV
Chart 2.3





























































































































Source: Banco de la Reublica
Chart 2.4
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Source: Banco de Le Republica  9
3. Houses prices and monetary policy in a model for the Colombian economy  
 
In this section, we describe, intuitively, the model used in the simulations 
that compares the performance of alternative monetary rules in the presence of 
housing prices misalignments from fundamentals. The model that explains the 
correlations between housing prices, investment and consumption was 
developed by Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), henceforth APV. The APV 
model describes the transmission mechanism that allows financial frictions in 
the credit markets to have an important impact on consumption and housing 
investment. We extend the APV model based on Bernanke and Gertler (1999) to 
allow the possibility of exogenous bubbles in housing prices.  
 
This section is divided in three parts. In part 3.1 we describe the main 
characteristics of the APV model. In part 3.2 we extend the model explaining 
how exogenous house price bubbles are introduced to the model.  In part 3.3 we 
present some econometric evidence that the model can be applied to the 
Colombian economy. 
 
3.1. The APV model 
 
The central hypothesis of the model is that house prices play a role 
because housing is used as collateral to reduce agency costs associated with 
borrowing to finance housing investment and consumption. In the model, 
households are exposed to idiosyncratic risk of fluctuations in their house 
prices and personal bankruptcy is associated with significant monitoring costs 
faced by lenders. The costly state verification problem induces lenders to charge 
a premium over a risk-free interest rate to borrowers.  
 
Fluctuations in housing prices play a large role in the determination of 
borrowing conditions of households. When net worth is lower, the probability 
of default is higher and therefore the external finance premium charged by   10
lenders will also be higher leaving households with less scope to finance 
housing investment and consumption. When house prices fall, households that 
are moving home have a smaller deposit available to buy their next home. 
Therefore the mortgage rates that they obtain from lenders are higher which 
leave them with less capacity to finance consumption. Moreover, given that 
interest rates on collateralized loans are lower than interest rates for unsecured 
credits, households use all the collateralized borrowing that they are allowed 
but all additional credit they need is obtained to a higher cost.   
 
The presence of these credit-market frictions gives rise to a “financial 
accelerator mechanism” that affects housing investment dynamics. For 
example, a positive shock to economic activity causes a rise in housing demand, 
which leads to a rise in house prices and net worth. The external finance 
premium decreases which in turn leads to a further increase in housing 
investment and consumption.  This general equilibrium feedback mechanism 
provides an additional source of amplification and propagation to underlying 
disturbances to the macroeconomy. 
 
In the APV model, the main modeling issue is how to generate both 
consumers borrowing and lending within a general equilibrium framework 
without losing tractability. To model consumer behavior in a rather stylized 
way, each household is modeled as a composite of two behavioral types: 
homeowners and consumers. Homeowners decide on the investment in 
housing, borrow funds to purchase the houses and rent them to consumers.  
They finance the purchase of houses partly with their net worth and partly from 
funds provided by the financial system. The financial intermediaries charge a 
premium to the homeowners for the intermediated funds.  Consumers, on the 
other hand, save, supply labor, consume goods and rent housing services from 
the homeowners. In order to capture the fact that households use part of their 
housing equity to finance consumption, consumers and homeowners are 
further linked by a ‘transfer’ that homeowners pay to consumers.  Whenever   11
house prices increases, households face a decision choice between increasing 
the transfer (current consumption) and a cheaper future finance premium to 
finance housing investment.   
 
Another particular characteristic of the APV model is that it divides the 
consumers into two types. Some fraction of consumers has accumulated enough 
wealth, so their behavior is well described by the permanent income hypothesis 
(PIH) with consumption satisfying the standard Euler equation. This fraction of 
consumers saves and is able to smooth consumption. The other fraction of 
consumers might be impatient or might have borrowing constraints which 
make them consume their current income in each period, in this sense behave 
as consumers rule-of-thumb (ROT). Their sources of income in each period are 
their labor wages and the transfer that receive from homeowners. More 
specifically, ROT consumers are assumed to borrow only contingent on the 
value of their houses. This separation between consumers captures the fact that  
Households with high liquid assets (PIH consumers) are less likely to extract 
home equity to finance consumption.  
 
   The rest of the model follows a standard New Keynesian model. The 
consumption goods sector presents nominal price stickiness so that monetary 
policy has real effects in the short run. Only fundamentals drive house prices 
which are determined by a q-theory of investment with a convex adjustment 
cost. Adjustment costs are included to permit a variable price of capital 
therefore. Changes in fundamental price of houses will affect the balance sheets 
of households and their cost of borrowing. Thus, the financial accelerator serves 
to amplify only fundamental shocks. In this paper, the extension of the APV 
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            3.2 Adding exogenous house price bubbles to the APV model 
 
This section follows closely the Bernanke and Gertler (1999) model.  We 
add exogenous bubbles to the APV model as follows. Investment is related to 
the fundamental value of housing capital, Qt. The fundamental value capital is 
the present value of dividends the capital is expected to generate.  
  
  (1)  [] { }
Q
t t t t t R Q D E Q 1 1 1 / ) 1 ( + + + − + = δ  
 
where  δ is the physical depreciation of capital,  1 + t D  are dividends, and 
Q
t R 1 +  is 
the relevant stochastic gross discount rate at t for dividends received in period 
t+1.  
However, observed house prices, St, may temporarily differ from 
fundamental values because of bubbles for example.  A bubble exists whenever 
St – Qt  ≠ 0. It is assumed that if a bubble exists at date t, it persists with 
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and p < a < 1. When a is close to one this bubble specification can be made 
arbitrarily close to a rational bubble1.  Given that a / p >1, the bubble will grow 
until such time as it burst.  The expected part of the bubble follows the process  
 












+ +  
  Because the parameter is restricted to be less than unity, the discounted 
value of the bubble converges to zero over time. 
 
  It is possible to derive an expression for the evolution of the market price 
of houses inclusive of the bubble using the expressions (1) and (3): 
                                                 
1  See Blanchard and Watson (1982). Like in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), we assume p=0.5 and a=0.98.   13
 
(4)   [ ] { }
S
t t t t t R S D E S 1 1 1 / ) 1 ( + + + − + = δ  
where the return on housing stocks,  
S
t R 1 + , is related to the fundamental return 
on capital, 
Q
t R 1 + , by 
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When there is a positive bubble,  t t Q S >  therefore the expected return on 
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A market price of housing higher than its fundamental value will have affect 
real activity in two ways. First, the external finance premium is assumed to 
depend on the market value of housing. So whenever it is higher than the 
fundamental value, the financial conditions of homeowners improves and they 
will be able to obtain funds from financial institutions to a lower financial 
premium. Second, rule-of-thumb consumers will be able to finance more 
consumption because the value of their houses increases. Therefore, the main 
link between changes in housing prices and the real economy remains the 
financial accelerator. 
 
  The equations of the extended model used for simulations are presented 
in the appendix. 
  
  3.3. Empirical evidence of the link between real activity and financial 
                   position of households in Colombia. 
 
In this sub-section we present some empirical evidence on how balance 
sheet conditions have important effects on the demand side of the Colombian 
economy. Remember that, in our general equilibrium framework, when house 
prices rise and balance sheets improve, the increased demand for housing 
induces an even further increase in prices. This rise in house prices cause   14
improvements in financial conditions of households, which fuel further 
increases in consumption and housing investment.   
 
  Aggregate demand is a weighted average of the expenditures 
components, PIH consumption, ROT consumption and investment. Besides, the 
premium on external financing of investment is related to homeowners 
leverage ratio, and consumption of ROT consumers depends on household net 
worth. Therefore, it is possible to obtain an expression for a dynamic IS curve 
that depends on the real interest rate and the leverage ratio as follows2: 
 
(6)        
t t t t i
t t i p t t t r t t t t t r t
h s n w
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where  t y  is the output gap;  t r  is the real interest rate;  t n  measures housing 
equity;  t s  is the market price of housing;  t k  is capital stock in housing;  ) ( t t k s +  
represent housing expenditures, therefore  ) ( t t t n k s − +  measures leverage;   
r w , p w ,  i w  are the corresponding weights of rule of thumb consumption, 
permanent income consumption and investment; χ  is the elasticity of rule-of-
thumb consumers to their leverage ratio; ϑ  is the elasticity of external finance 
premium with respect to leverage, and σ is the elasticity of aggregate demand 
to real interest rate, and  t τ  is an aggregate demand shock. 
 
  The first term on the right-hand side of equation (6) implies that 
aggregate demand depends on current balance-sheet conditions owing to rule-
of-thumb consumers, (Gilchrist, 2002). The last term implies that aggregate 
demand also depends on future balance-sheet conditions owing to the forward-
looking nature of housing investment decisions.  
                                                 
2 For details see Gilchrist (2002).   15
 
  Estimation proceeds by substituting actual for expected values in (6) and 
taking into account some level persistence in the aggregate demand. Under 
rational expectations, the actual values represent the appropriate expectations 
up to an additive and orthogonal expectation error (Bennett McCallum 1979), 
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where the error term is a combination of aggregate demand shocks and 
expectation errors. Because  t u  is correlated with the regressors, instrumental 
variables are needed to ensure consistency. We used the Generalized Method of 
Moments for the estimation. The set of parameters to be estimated is 
) , , , , ( 2 1 η η ϑ χ σ = Ω . The vector of instruments used to conform the orthogonality 
conditions is {1, 2 − t y, 3 − t y,   ( t
S
t r r − ), ( 1 1 − − − t
S
t r r ),  t r ,  1 − t r ,  t s ,  1 − t s }. Real market price 
of houses,  t s , are house price index deflated by the consumer price index
3; leverage 
ratio is calculated based on information published by GRECO and the stock on 
mortgage loans from ICAV;  t
S
t r r −  is the premium between the mortgage rate and the 
interest rate on CDTs. The sample period is 1990:1 through 2000:4.  
 
  The estimations results are reported in table 3.1.  All parameter estimates 
have the expected signed and are significant. The Hansen (1982) statistic for 
testing the validity of the over-identifying restrictions implied by the model, J-
statistic, does not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis that the model is 
correctly specified at a five percent significance level. The first and second row 
in the table corresponds to the forward and the backward looking coefficients of 
aggregate demand, respectively. The estimate of the elasticity of aggregate 
demand to real interest rate,σ , is in line with estimations in other studies4. The 
elasticity of consumption to the balance sheet of households,χ , is near one and 
                                                 
3 Carrasquilla et al (1994) 
4 See for example Gómez et al (2002)   16
significant. This elasticity seems low with respect to estimates in countries such 
as United Kingdom but it is reasonable given poor level of financial instruments 
in Colombia. The elasticity of the external finance premium to the financial 
conditions of households is near one and significant, which is evidence of the 
importance of the financial accelerator mechanism in the real economy. 
   






J(T) =   2.053
Sample adjusted 1990:4 2000:4
*Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance
Bandwidth: Fixed  (4.5)
Kernel: Quadratic Spectral
Adjusted R-squared    0.7042
J (T)  (5% significancia)    =   5.762
and balance sheet effects
Table 3.1








4. Model Simulations and Output and Inflation Variability  
 
4.1 With and without direct response of monetary policy to asset prices 
 
In this section we use the model described in section 3 in order to asses 
the effects of a housing bubble when monetary policy does not respond directly 
to housing prices and when monetary policy responds directly to housing 
prices. We perform two alternative analyses. First, we describe the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy and the results on some macroeconomic 
variables of the model based on simulations under two alternative policy rules. 
Second, we compute the unconditional variances of output and inflation under   17
four alternative policy rules.  The complete model used for simulations and its 
calibration for the Colombian economy is presented in the Appendix.  
 
  In the first exercise, we compare the impulse responses of output, 
inflation rate, housing investment and consumption under two alternative 
monetary policy rules: one policy rule react only to inflation rate and the other 
policy rule responds to both inflation rate and housing prices. The policy rule 
used for the simulations of the model when monetary policy responds only to 
the inflation rate is  








The alternative policy rule used in the simulations is a rule where 
monetary policy reacts directly to market house prices besides responding to 
inflation rate: 











 is the nominal interest policy rate,  t π  is the inflation rate, and  t S  is the 
market price of housing. 
 
Notice that these rules are simple Inflation Forecast Based rules, IFB. The 
literature on simple policy rules has pointed out the advantages of using such 
rules compared to optimal policy rules. Optimal policy rules are the most 
efficient rules in terms of minimizing the long run output and inflation 
volatility, Svensson and Rudebush (1998). However, optimal-contingent rules 
respond to current and lagged values of all the state variables in the model. 
Specifically, they may respond not only to deviation of inflation from target, but 
also to the output gap, foreign inflation rate, real exchange rate, and so on, 
Dennis (2000). Therefore, given their complexity, optimal policy rules may be 
very impractical to implement.   Simple policy rules, on the other hand, have 
several advantages: they are much easier to implement; it is easy for private 
agents to understand policy and they can verify the Central Bank behavior. 
Among simple policy rules, IFB rules are more efficient than other simple rules   18
that respond to a few set of variables. Because IFB rules respond to a model-
consistent inflation forecast, they respond to a wide array of macroeconomic 
variables, which make them very efficient, Haldane and Batini (1998).  
 
For the first set of simulations, we set the values of   9 . 0 = R ρ    25 . 0 = π r    
1 . 0 = S r .  Chart 4.1 shows the effect of a housing price bubble without and with 
reaction of monetary policy to market housing prices. When monetary policy 
reacts only to inflation rate, the bubble in housing market translates into an 
increase in output, inflation, housing investment, consumption and net worth, 
leading the economy to “overheat”.  Initially, the fundamental price of houses 
increases because the public knows that monetary authorities will not react to 
the bubble, so the present value of the dividends the capital is expected to 
generate is high. Investment responds to fundamentals so it increases. The rise 
in market price of housing stimulates spending and output further both 
through the balance sheet effects given that the external finance premium 
decreases significantly, and through the wealth effect on consumption. Given 
that inflation rate has increased, the policy interest rate increases. When the 
bubble burst, financial conditions of the firms deteriorates which is reflected in 
a strong increase in external finance premium and lower investment and 
output.  
 
If monetary policy reacts directly to housing prices, it may cause the very 
recession in output that it was intended to prevent. The mechanism is the 
following. As in the previous case, investment depends on the fundamental 
value of house prices. Given that the public now knows that the central bank 
will rise interest rates as a reaction to the bubble, the present value of the 
dividends the capital is expected to generate falls causing the fundamental price 
of housing to fall even though its market price is positive due to the bubble. 
Investment decisions depend on fundamentals and the financial conditions of 
firms. The decline in fundamental values more than offset the stimulating effect 
of the bubble causing recession and deflation.     19
Chart 4.1. Response to a housing bubble shock: with and without direct 
response to housing prices. 
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In the second set of simulations we show that if monetary policy reacts to 
asset prices the resulting output costs are lower if the reaction to inflation is 
significantly higher relative to the reaction to asset prices.  The previous 
simulations were done with a relatively passive feedback coefficient on 
inflation,  25 . 0 = π r . Now we compare the results of a monetary policy that reacts to 
both inflation and asset prices in a somehow passive way with respect to inflation with a 
policy that is more active,  0 . 1 = π r . The rest of the parameters are the same:  9 . 0 = R ρ  
1 . 0 = S r . In Chart 4.2 we report the results.  With an active monetary policy, it is 
possible to compensate the output losses of the recession with positive levels of 
output at the beginning of the bubble. The public knows that while inflation is 
under control monetary authorities will not rise interest rates very much which 
allows that the fundamental price of housing and investment rise initially.   
Under a passive monetary policy reacting to asset prices may cause higher 
losses in investment and output. 
 
As a complement of the previous analysis, we compute the unconditional 
variance of output and inflation under four different monetary policy rules. The 
results are reported in table 4.1. As we can see, the policy rule that reacts 
strongly and only to inflation rate is the most efficient among the rules 
considered.  Output and inflation variability are significantly higher whenever 









Output and Inflation Variability under alternative policy rules
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Chart 4.2. Response to a housing bubble shock when monetary policy 
reacts to both inflation and housing prices: Active vs Passive feedback 
coefficient on inflation. 
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4.2 The effect of Leverage on the responses to asset price. 
 
In an effort by the government to alleviate the social and economic problems 
originated during the nineties in 1999 was introduced in Colombia a new Law of 
Housing; Law 546 from 1999. Some of the modifications that the Law introduced to 
confront the finance housing sector crisis were for example that the that interest could 
not be capitalized, allowing to debtors total or partial pre-payments to the stock of debt 
on housing without penalization and that banks should request a higher deposit on loans 
to finance housing, among others. On the other hand, given the severity of the crisis in 
the housing sector, households seem to be more averse to engage in very high debts to 
finance purchases of their houses. All this has had important consequences in the 
quality of the balance sheet of households. The ratio net worth to capital has returned to 
the levels that it presented before the nineties, Chart 4.3.  
 
In our model, this effect can be captured by evaluating the effects of a bubble in 
the housing sector under alternative levels of steady-state leverage ratio. Chart 4.4 
shows that the reduction in steady-state leverage (from 0.7 to 06) significantly 
moderates the business cycle. Therefore, prudential regulation may have an important 
role to prevent very strong economic cycles.  
 
Chart 4.3
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Chart 4.4.  Response to a housing bubble shock: The effect of Leverage.  
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5. Final remarks 
 
Asset prices bubbles and housing prices bubbles remains as one of the 
most important challenges of monetary policy. Even though many inflation 
targeting countries have been able to stabilized inflation in low levels during 
the last decade, the possibility of asset prices bubbles emerges as a threat to 
economic and financial stability.  In this paper we have shown that the role of 
inflation targeting or, in general, of monetary policy to contain a bubble is very 
limited. It cannot be left to monetary policy alone to minimize the chance of a 
bubble episode or to reduce its magnitude. Monetary policy may contribute to 
moderate the business cycle when it reacts only to inflation; this, somehow, 
guarantee that monetary policy will not over-react (for example in the face of a 
asset price bubble) causing a recession in the economic activity. Instead, a 
combination of monetary policy and prudential regulation may be used to 
encourage mechanisms that may help to contain inflated speculations in asset 
prices and to send signals to the markets about potential vulnerabilities.  
   25
References 
 
Aoki, K., J. Proudman, and G. Vlieghe. 2004 “House Prices, Consumption, and 
Monetary Policy: a Financial Accelerator Approach”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 13 (August): 414-435. 
 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler. M. 1999. “Monetary Policy and Asset Price 
Volatility” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Fourth 
Quarter 1999, 84(4), pp 17-52. 
 
Bordo,M. and O. Jeanne. 2002. “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: Does Benign 
Neglet Make Sense?” IMF Working Paper No. 02/225. 
 
Cardenas, M. and A. Badel. 2003. “La crisis de financiamiento hipotecario en 
Colombia: causas y consecuencias”,  Coyuntura Economica, Vol XXXIII (2): 35-64. 
 
Carrasquilla, A, A. Galindo, y H. Patrón. 1994 “Endeudamiento e Inflación de 
Activos en Colombia”, Banco de la Republica, Mimeo. 
 
Cecceti, S., H.Gerberg, J. Lipsky, and S. Wadhwani. 2000, “Asset Prices and 
Central Bank Policy”  Geneva Reports on the World Economy No.2. London: 
CEPR and ICMB. 
 
Goodfriend, M. 2003 “Interest Rate Policy Should Not React Directly to Asset 
Prices.” In Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and 
International policies, 445-446. Edited by W. Hunter, G.Kaufman, and M. 
Pomerleano. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Gomez, J., J.D. Uribe, H. Vargas (2002). “The implementation of Inflation 
Targeting in Colombia,” Banco de la Republica, Borradores de Economia , No. 202.  
 
Gilchrist, S (2002), “Commentary” in Financial Innovation and Monetary 
Transmission: Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, April 5 and 6, 2001. FRBNY, Economic Policy Review, 8 (1):  
179-182. 
 
Grupo de Estudios del Crecimiento Económico, GRECO. 2002. El crecimiento 
económico colombiano en el siglo XX. Edited by Banco de la República-Fondo 
de Cultura Económica. 
 
Dennis, R (2000), Optimal Simple Targeting Rules for Small Open Economies, 
Federal Research Bank of San Francisco, December (Working Paper).  
 
Haldane, A. and N. Batini. 1998. “Forward-Loking Rules for Monetary Policy”, 
in J.B. Taylor (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago: University Press for NBER.  
   26
Helbling, T. and M. Terrones. 2003. When Bubbles Burst. IMF World Economic 
Outlook (April): 61-94. 
 
Lopez, A. 1994. “La teoría del ingreso permanente y las restricciones de liquidez 
en Colombia”, In Estabilización y crecimiento. Edited  by Fedesarrollo-Tercer 
Mundo Editores. 
 
López, M. 2004. “La vivienda como colateral: política monetaria precios de la 
vivienda y consumo en Colombia”, Banco de la Republica, Borradores de 
Economia , No.299.  
 
Selody, J. and  C. Wilkins. 2004. “Asset Prices and Monetary Policy: A Canadian 
Perspective on the Issues”, Bank of Canada Review, Autumn 2004.   
 
Svensson, L., and G. Rudebush. 1998. Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting, NBER 
(Working paper 6512). 
 
Villar, L y H. Rincón. 2001. “Flujos de capital y regímenes cambiarios en la 
década de los noventa”, Ensayos sobre Política Económica, ESPE No. 39. 
 
   27
Appendix: Model equations used in simulations 
 
In this appendix we present the functional form of the first order conditions and 
other equations used in the simulations of the model. We refer the readers to 
Aoki et al (2004) for the complete description of the main characteristics and 
assumptions of the model. The model has been expanded to introduce 
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Evolution of state variables 
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The expectations given information known as of period of the value of variable 
t X  are written  t sX E . Equation (A.1) is the period-utility function of household 
i. Equation (A.2) denotes a CES consumption aggregator between consumption 
goods 
i
t c  and housing services 
i
t h . (A.3) is the demand for each of the 
consumption good.  
 
Equation (B.1) is the economy resource constraint.  (B.2) is the usual Euler 
condition for consumers of the type PIH. (B.3) and (B.4) describes the 
(composite) consumption of the ROT consumers. These equations embodies the 
assumption that ROT consumption depends on labor income  t tL W  and the ratio 
of net worth to market value of capital (leverage),   ) / ( t t t h s N . The composite 
aggregate consumption is given by (B.5), where  n is the fraction of consumers 
PIH in the economy.  (B.6) and (B.7) are the demands for each of the 
consumption goods and housing services, respectively.  Equation (B.8) is the 
composite price index.  
 
Equations (B.9)-(B.14) characterize housing investment demand including the 
bubble. (B.9) relates investment,  t I   to the fundamental value of capital,  t q , 
with one period delay for planning investment. Equation (B.10) describes the 
expected evolution of the bubble. Equation (B.11) defines the fundamental 
return to capital as the sum of the current return to capital and the increase in 
fundamental value. Similarly, (B.12) describes the returns on market value of 
capital. (B.13) illustrate the relationship between the market return and the 
fundamental return, which depends on the bubble. Equation (B.14) is the 
financial accelerator equation which links the spread between safe returns and 
stock returns to household leverage. 
 
Equation (B.15) is a Cobb-Douglas production function for the producers of 
consumption goods. (B.16) is the first order condition for labor in the household 
intertemporal optimization problem.  (B.17) reflects the assumption that prices 
of consumption goods are sticky. More specifically it is the first order condition 
for optimal pricing of the seller indexed z .  (B.18) is a Phillips curve that can be 
derived from (B.17) using the Calvo (1983) staggered price setting. Equation 
(B.19) is the real marginal cost of the firm in terms of the consumption goods.  
   30
Equations (B.20) and (B.24) are transition equations for the two state variables, 
capital and net worth. (B.20) denotes the evolution of the Net worth of 
households. The first term is the ex-post return housing times the housing 
investment, the second term is the ex-post cost of debt and the third one are the 
transfers that homeowners give to ROT consumers.  (B.21) denotes the 
evolution of capital stock in housing.  (B.22) is the monetary policy rule; the 
short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy.  (B.23) is 
the real interest rate. Finally, (B.24) and (B.25) impose that the exogenous 
disturbances to government spending and technology obey stationary 
autoregressive processes.  
 
  Parameter values used in the simulations were calibrated for the 





Discount factor 0.980 M. López (2001)
Steady state real interest rate 4.120 M. López (2001)
Share of consumption goods in aggregate consumption 0.670 Average data from the 1980-1990s.
Elastisity of substitution between housing and 1.000 Calibrated
consumption goods
Inverse elasticity of labor supply 0.330 Literature
Portion of rule of thumb consumers 0.400 Alejandro López (1994) 
Share of capital in production function 0.350 GRECO (2003, Ch 3)
Depreciation of housing 0.025 GRECO (2003, Ch 3)
elasticity of fundamental price of capital w.r.t.  0.550 Chirinko (1993)
Investment / Capital ratio
Probability of not adjusting price 0.800 Bejarano, J (2003) (5 quarters)
Steady state premium (annual) 4.000 Data from the 1990s.
Steady state leverage ratio 0.700 According to new regulation
Interest rate smoothing 0.750 Raquel Bernal (2002)
Government spending/Output ratio 0.200 Data from the 1990s.
Elasticity of premium with respect to leverage ratio 0.600 Calibrated - Based on estimation
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